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How Children and Adolescents
Relate to Nature
Patricia Nevers, University of Hamburg,
Department of Education

Paper presented at the Center for the Study of Ethics in Society at
Western Michigan University, September 21,1999

Patricia Nevers is a former American who completed her B.A. at Ripon
College, Ripon Wisconsin with a major in biology. She studied biology and chemistry
at the University of Freiburg in Germany, received a PhD. in genetics and worked in
research in genetics for 6 years after her PhD. She taught biology and chemistry at
German secondary schools for four years and then moved to a position as a researcher in
biology education at the Institute for Science Education at the University of Kiel. There
she worked at developing teaching materials on gene technology. During this time she
became involved with bioethical problems in the classroom. Subsequently, Dr. Nevers
took a leave of absence for three years to work on a project in the areas of philosophy
and sociology. Following her investigation into the role of technol9gy in the biological
sciences, in 1994 she accepted a position as a professor of biology education at the
University of Hamburg. Dr. Nevers has been involved with children's philosophy,
environmental education and environmental philosophy, as well as with the problems of
STS-education.
She is author, with Elfriede Bilmann-Mahecha, of "Patterns of Reasoning
Exhibited by Children and Adolescents in Response to Moral Dilemmas Involving
Plants, Animals and Ecosystems," Journal of Moral Education, vol. 26, No.2, 1997, pp.
169-186.
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What d~ children and young people think and feel about nature in general and about
particular natural objects such as plants, animals and ecosystems? What significance
do they attach to nature and non-human natural objects? To what extent do they
regard them as moral objects? How do young people respond when confronted with a
conflict of interest, for example, when extending a playground to provide children
with more space to play' requires CUlling down trees? What arguments do young
people use in defending their positions? And finally, what values and interpretive
patterns are at the root of these arguments? These are questions which my colleagues
Elfriede Billmann-Mahecha, a psychologist from the University of Hannover, and
Ulrich Gebhard, an professor of biology education at the University of Hamburg, and
I have been investigating for the past 3 years (Nevers et ai, 1997; Gebhard et ai, 1997;
Billmann-Mahecha et ai, 1998).

How have we beel! conducting ollr investigation?
The focus of our study at the moment is values and underlying

interpretive

frameworks, that is, mental structures that guide us in making decisions, especially in
situations in which we have limited knowledge. For this kind of study we feel that
hermeneutic

methods are particularly informative. Inspired by the concept of

philosophy for children developed by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy
for Children at Montclair State University in New Jersey and by the work of our
colleagues Ekkehard Martens and Helmut Schreier (1994) in this area we have been
conducting group discussions with children and adolescents. The following elements
of these discussions have been derived from children's philosophy:

- The discussion is initiated by a stimulus in the form of a story involving a
conflict or problem.
- The content of the discussion is philosoph~al, centered around aspects of
environmental ethics and the philosophy of !lature.
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- The discussion is conducted by a knowledgeable adult, who attempts to
direct it with a minimum of intervention.
- The purpose of the discussion is to stimulate the exchange of arguments.

As opposed to some approaches to children's philosophy we have not attempted to try
to improve philosophical discourse, at least not yet. And we do not provide the
children with a philosophical interpretation at the end of the discussion. I shall explain
our reasons for this course of action later on.

We have conducted discussions with children and adolescents in three age groups, 68, 10-12 and 14-16, using stories directed towards three different kinds of objects,
individual plants, individual animals and complex ecosystems or landscapes. We have
also used stories involving objects that differ in the degree of artificiality, for
example, a domestic pig as opposed to a squinel.
conducting these discu~sions in

We have engaged our students in

a~ attempt to combine

research and teaching but also

for obvious pragmatic reasons such as time and money. We now have an archive of
more than 100 transcribed discussions that are currently being analyzed in the manner
of grounded theory outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1996). We have been fortunate to
receive a small grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft which allowed us to
hire a researcher, Wolfram GUnther, who is now helping us to sort out our data.

Why have we chosen a less structured/arm a/children's philosophy?
Generally speaking the basic goals of children's philosophy are the following:

a) ACADEMIC: to promote clear thinking, the techniques of philosophical discourse
and the search for truth
b) PRAGMATIC: to enable children and young peopl~ to clarify problems and reach
reasonable ?ecisions in everyday life and
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c) EPISTEMOLOGICAL:

to gain insights into. the way children think about

philosophical problems

We have been concentrating on the third goal for the time being since it is prerequisite
to the others. In order to promote clear thinking and help children find ways to solve
dilemmas involving nature, one has to understand the ways children deal with such
problems. In addition, it is important to be able to reconstruct the solutions that
philosophers have found for such problems.

However, in both instances our

knowledge is limited. The philosophy of nature is a new and dynamic field that
includes many and varied positions. And like other areas of applied ethics,
environmental ethics is teeming with moral pluralism. Our own working group is no
exception. Moreover, so far only very few researchers in the field of the psychology
of moral development have directed their attention to human relationships to nature.

The various different positions that have been elaborated by philosophers

in

environmental ethics so far demonstrate the prevalence of moral pluralism. Some of
these are outlined below:

Basic Positions in Environmental

Ethics

Main question: Does nature have any value above and beyond its importance or
usefulness for humans, or, in other words, does nature or some part of it have
moral status?
Anthropocentrism:
Physiocentrism:
Anthropocentric

NO
YES
Positions

Nature is only of instrumental value as a means for satisfying human needs and
desires. Thus nature provides the means for our very survival but also may serve as
a source of aesthetic, religious and scientific inspiration, provide the means for
recreation, or serve as a resource for moral reflection. Human u e of nature may
vary from respectful use to despotic use.
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Physiocelltric

Positions

1.
Pathocclltrism
Only sentient organisms are worthy of moral status, that
is, organisms that are conscious and capable of experiencing pain.
2.
Biocentrism
their being alive.

All living things can be attributed moral status by virtue of

3.
Holism All of nature, both biotic and abiotic, possesses moral status.
However, the reasons for assigning moral status to all of nature vary. Some rely on
ecological arguments. Some refer to the teleology or purposefulness of all parts of
nature. Some believe that everything that exists should be protected, simply by
virtue of existence (ontological arguments). Some consider all of nature to be an
organism worthy of rcspect.

One is inclined to think that modern environmental philosophy is entrenched in what
might be called a bookkeeping framework. It is preoccupied with the following
questions: What objects in nature are entitled to moral consideration and what are the
grounds for attributing this status? Value is the currency of moral consideration.

Moral pluralism in environmental ethics is not just a result of the newness of the field.
It prevails in other areas of ethics as well, and it is enhanced by its applied nature. As
scholars in all areas of ethics venture out into the world of non-philosophers, into the
realms of children, bioethical commissions, citizens forums and such, they discover
that it is difficult if not impossible to conduct an ideal ethical di'scourse of the kind
philosophers used to envision. The orientation of the participants is usually not
exclusively rational. They are generally not motivated towards reaching consensus on
a theoretical basis. And they don't seem convinced that there are universal principles
that they all share and will eventually be able to agree upon if they discuss the matter
thoroughly enough. Instead we are confronted with a broad variety of views and a
great deal of dissension (Bayertz, 1999). We find varied and sundry individuals with
unique positions they have developed on the basis of personal experiences, feelings
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rational reflection and

argumentative communication. Is this something to be lamented? I think not.

As my colleague Ekkehard Martens and other ethicists have pointed out, moral
pluralism is the logical consequence of enlightenment and secularization, which have
given us the freedom to develop highly individual positions. It can rightly be
considered a sign of emancipation. However, these developments have al

0

left a

great deal of turbulence in their wake - uncertainty, indecision, intolerance and
indifference. In view of the troubled waters of moral pluralism with no land in sight,
we are forced to chart a course between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of
total moral relativism (see Martens, 1999). The attractiveness of dogmatism as a
means for reducing complexity is one obvious danger. But complete relativism, an
"anything goes" attitude, is equally dangerous. In the traditional ethics of human
relationships one can find some comfort in the observation that many Judeo-Christian
values prevail in our society in spite of secularization. And certainly there are
common human experiences such as love and pain that provide some grounds for
common moral values. With respect to nature, however, the attitudes and experiences
of people all over the world are highly divergent and common grounds probably less
compelling. To deal with this situation new ways of thinking about morality must be
encouraged and the role of ethical discourse must be reconsidered.

In summary then, the fact that we know so little about the way children think about
nature and the fact that the ways philosophers think about nature are so highly diverse
make it reasonable to at least start off with a less structured, inductive approach for
philosophical discussions with children and adolescents. Another reason for favoring
discussions with children that are less structured and not exclusively oriented towards
identifying basic philosophical principles or exercising.basic philosophical techniques
has to do with the unusual asymmetry of the relationship between humans and non-
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human

nature.

Here

we are dealing

with conflicts

between

technologically

empowered, rational beings and non-rational objects lacking any form of technology.
Traditional ethics based on the equality of rational discourse partners is not adequate
for dealing with such situations. As feminists such as Alisa Carse (1991) have pointed
out with respect to bioethical education, other moral skills and capacities in addition
to rational thinking are required for appropriately dealing with asymmetric situations.
In particular, skills and capacities associated with the virtue of care are necessary.
These include the capacity to direct attention to the particularities of the situation at
hand by means of emotional attunement and sympathetic insight. They also include
the use of cultivated emotion in order to discem the problem at hand and respond to it
adequately. As we shall see, emotional attunement probably plays an important role in
human relationships to nature.
Let us now retulll to examining how children relate to nature.

Stories depicting conflicts of interest
One of the stories with which we have been working is the following:
The Tree House
Peter and Sarah are planning to build a tree house. It's supposed to be a particularly
fine one, in which several children can sleep and eat and read comics. Each child is
to have his or her own corner in the tree house for storing candy and other private
things. The tree they've chosen for their building project is a lovely old willow
with big, roomy branches on an empty lot not far away. It's really the only tree
around that's suitable for their purposes. The others in the surroundings are in
private yards or parks. Besides, they're all too small: Flushed with excitement Sara
describes her plan:
"First we have to blaze a proper trail to the tree by chopping away all those
brambles. Then we'll cover it willi nat stones. Of course, we have to clear the
space beneath the tree as well. Otherwise we can't find things if they fall out of the
tree hou e. We'll fasten a ladder to the trunk and saw <if those two branches that
are in the way so that we won't have any trouble climbing in and out. Then we'll
nail boards between the branches to serve as railings and put in some kind of floors
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here and there. We might have to remove some more branches if we need more
light in some places."
While listening to his friend Sarah, Peter's expression becomes more and more
serious. He's known the empty lot and the willow all his life and is familiar with
every inch of thcm since he often goes there just to be by himself. He knows
exactly where different birds nest in the tree and surrounding brambles and can
name all the plants surrounding the tree. He finds the willow particularly beautiful
just the way it is and replies to Sarah:
"I've changed my mind. 1 don't want a tree house after all, and 1 don't want other
kids to build one either. 1 don't want to change the tree in any way at all. I think we
should just leave nature in peace."
Sarah is annoyed. She can't understand Peter's lack of enthusiasm and replies in a
huff,
"I don't agree at all. First of all, we're not talking about "nature" but about a messy
old abandoned lot. I've never seen the owner, and he certainly doesn't care what we
do to the tree. The tree itself can't care one way or the other. Besides, children
have a right to play, and that's the most important thing."
What do you think?
1 wish to point out some particularities of this story:

- The story involves a conflict of interests, but different types of interests are
involved. The "interests" of the tree addressed in this story are quite basic ones, that
is, survival, remaining whole and undamaged. Those of the children are also quite
basic - having the freedom to play - but not quite as essential as those of the tree, since
they could possibly be satisfied in another manner. These are the types of conflicts
most

common

in applied

environmental

ethics

in

industrial

societies.

In

underdeveloped countries conflicts involving essential interests of both parties are
probably more common.
- The conflict presented draws on everyday hperience

of children. It is not

a "real" one, but it is not strongly hypothetical either. A more hypothetical
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conflict might look like this: You are in a hot air balloon above the earth and
losing altitude. You have to throw something overboard. Would you decide
to toss out your African violet? Hypothetical dilemmas are used in
philosophy to focus the discussion more strongly on purely cognitive
aspects, but since we are interested in tapping other aspects of morality as
well, we have chosen a different type of dilemma.
The conflict concerns what Rest et al (1999, pp. 15) might refer to as
"micromorality" involving individual interests and relationships as opposed
to

"macromorality,"

which

deals

with

"suprasocietal

interests

and

organization."
- The constellation is asymmetrical. The children are capable of reflecting
upon what is right and wrong; the tree cannot. The children are potential
moral agents, the tree a potential moral patient.
- The situation centers around negative duties rather than positive ones. The
children discuss whether or not it is justifiable to damage the tree by
building a tree house, not whether or not to water it. According to Peter
Kahn (1999, pp. 63-76) a conflict involving negative duties as opposed to
one involving positive duties is generally more readily conceived as being
morally binding and obligatory.
- The conflict involves an individual organism, not an ecosystem. This is
important since some theories of environmental ethics regard individual
organisms as irrelevant, or only relevant as part of a greater system.
- A few arguments are prcsented by the figures in the story. Sarah's position
is anthropocentric and resource oriented. She would like to use the tree for
certain purposes. Peter's position is that of a preservationist, one of
nonintervention.
- As we shall see, the combination of indiviclflalization, asymmetry, and the
prospect of damage to the object probably tends to evoke a view of the tree
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as being "needy" and may therefore stimulate a protective re ponse. In the
same line of thinking studies by Susan Opotow (1987, 199~) indicate that
perception of "neediness" of a natural object is more inclined to generate
concern for its protection than perception of potential usefulness.

Anthropomolphism as a common form of reasoning.
One of the most striking results of the group discussions we have analyzed so far is
the widespread use of anthropomorphic reasoning. Trees and animals are described
and interpreted as if they were humans. Certain physical qualities of humans such as
blood and hair are projected upon non-~uman objects. The leaves of the tree are
thought to be like human hair; the sap is compared with blood. But mental and
psychological qualities such as consciousness, the ability to feel pain and intentionally
may' also be ascribed to non-human objects. Thus with reference to cutting off the
branches of a tree lO-year old Ben says:

"Because (if) I like saw people chopping o./f.yOIl know, like, like I'd feel insane really,
like someone's sticking something into yOLt,like, or pulling skin off."

Nelly (10 years old) rejoins:

"Yes, sometimes I feel that feeling when like someone gets
this feeling nllls down my body, you know, like,

1'111,

/11111,

l'Just see it and then

feeling that I kind of feel that too,

how it hurts and evelytlzillg. "

The children are interpreting the tree in terms of their own bodily experience.
Suffering and pain arc very basic to that experience, perhaps a kind of common
denominator of humanity. The children's response to tbe story seems to be a classical
example of empathy, which is an important prerequisite for developing a moral
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attitude towards another person. It appears that by regarding the tree as human-like, it
is made a moral object. But how can we tell that the tree is considered a moral object?
What exactly distinguishes a moral issue from one involving, say, a personal
preference? First of all, a moral issue as opposed to social conventions or personal
preferences, always involves something of vital impOI1ance such as life and death,
freedom and self-fulfillment, or pleasure and pain, and this is obviously the case for
the tree. Moral issues are discussed in terms of right and wrong, should and should
not, and the "right" kind of behavior, character, intention, etc. is thought to be binding,
obligatory for everybody, not just for oneself. Furthermore, the "rightness" or
"wrongness" of an act is justified by refelTing to moral principles such as justice or the
pursuit of happiness.

In discussions with children evidence for a moral attitude is not straight forward. The
intensity of the discussion is one indication, as well as the use of words like "must"
and "ought." And reference is made to common moral principles such as well-being
and fairness. A normative orientation is further suggested when statements are made
that indicate that others are expected to think, feel and behave in the same way as
oneself. Indications of moralization of this kind can be found in connection with
anthropomorphic reasoning. However, further investigation is necessary to determine
whether they can be observed in other contexts as well.

According

to the Norwegian

environmental

philosopher

Arne Naess (1985),

identification is a prerequisite for empathy such as that expressed by children with
respect to trees. He defines identification as a spontaneous, non-rational but not
irrational process through which the interest or interests of another being are reacted
to as one's own interest or interests. He defines the self as that with which we identify
and self-realization as a process of ever-widening identification. More importantly,
identity precludes impartiality. We cannot be impa'rtial about ourselves, and this
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includes the things with which we identify. According to this line of thinking, orne
children apparently identify with trees, regard trees' interests as being the same as
their own and incorporate experiences with trees in their concept of self.

However, anthropomorphic reasoning does not exclude instrumental reasoning. Thus
the same children who empathize with trees and believe that they feel pain also know
that trees provide the oxygen that humans thrive on, that they filter the air we breathe
and produce fruit and wood for human consumption. And children readily proffer
such arguments in favor of saving trees as well.

Thus

both

highly

simultaneously.

subjective

and

objective

interpretations

And, as my colleague Ulrich Gebhard

of

nature

exist

(1994, pp. 51-57), a

psychoanalyst, has pointed out, one of the basic insights of psychoanalysis is that such
highly subjective ways of viewing the world are not lost or eliminated in the course of
accumulating objective knowledge, as Piaget once thought. They may be modified or
shifted about, and objective knowledge may become superimposed upon them, but
interpreting the world in the light of one's own body, perceptions and experiences
prevails throughout life as a solid foundation for knowing, judging and valuing the
world (see also Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Just how reasonable is anthropolllOlphic reasoning?
First of all, it is obvious, that when children talk about trees they are making
statements about human experience, not about trec experience, and that they project
this knowledge upon the tree. Is that legitimate? To the extent that there are
commonalties between human experience and that of trees, these statements are valid
by scientific standards, and truly, we may have more in common with a tree than we
think, if one considers the entire span of time in whjch trees and humans evolved
along a common pathway. But can these statements be taken literally? Do the children
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really believe such things, or are they metaphoric expressions, "as if' statements?
How much cognitive and affective distance really exists between Ben and the tree? Is
Ben's vision of the tree as a human perhaps merely a symbol that Ben has construed to
explain and make sense of the world? One does become sceptical when 8 year olds
vehemently maintain that if they could, trees would scream and run when the forester
comes to chop them down for Christmas, and at the same time insist upon having a
real Christmas tree, not a plastic one, in their living room. Children seem to be able to
shift between realistic and metaphoric interpretations of these objects. The metaphoric
interpretation

provides

more distance,

perhaps

even relief from a form of

identification that could be stifling.

Another question that arises in connection with the observation of anthropomorphism
is whether or no1 this way of viewing the world is the basis for assigning value to or
disclosing value in natural objects above and beyond their instrumental value to
humans. This question addresses a major issue in environmental ethics. Can we find
philosophically legitimate grounds for assigning intrinsic value to nature (Callicott,
1995)? Are identification with natural objects and anthropomorphism
anthropological

perhaps the

key to assigning or disclosing such value? Could it be that

anthropomorphism

is programmed in our genes and results in an innate affinity

towards nature such as that proposed by Kellett and Wilson (1993) in their book
entitled "The Biophilia Hypothesis?" No doubt, anthropomorphism is probably a very
important factor in developing respect for nature and assigning moral status to it. But
like most kinds of human behavior it is certainly not exclusively determined by genes,
and it is certainly not sufficient for assuring protection of nature. There are many
natural objects which do not lend themselves well to anthropomorphism - grass,
insects, sand dunes and complex and more abstract objects such as ecosystems and
species. These objects cannot be readily grasped by simple analogies to human
experience. Furthermore, to do moral justice to a tree or another non-human object we
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have to take into account its "otherness," its specific characteristics and "needs." This
in turn requires ways of knowing these objects above and beyond anthropomorphic
analogies. And finally, as we shall see, other, more powerful ways of interpreting the
world can be superimposed on anthropomorphic thinking.

A second stolY and a second set of group discussions
A second story with which we have been working involves something more complex,
an old apple orchard, a system that includes plants and animals, some domestic and
some not, as well as biotic and abiotic factors. This object is also somewhat artificial
since it was originally planted by humans and thus is not the same as a wilderness
area, which ranks high in the United States but is rare in Germany. Nevertheless, old
apple orchards in Germany may be highly diverse, self-su taining systems and are
being placed under protection in many areas.

The New Youth Center
The community is planning to build a new youth center. It's supposed to include
several tennis courts and a squash court as well as a swimming pool and body
building room. A coffee bar and disco are also part of the construction plans.
Many people in the community are enthused about the plans since there's no other
center of this kind in the immediate surroundings. In addition the center will
provide a number of jobs for young people. Other people in the community, on the
other hand, are strongly opposed to the plans for the center, in particular because a
lot with many lovely old fruit trees has been selected as the construction site. The
local environmental protection agency has been seeking to have this lot declared a
protected area.
Since the center is intended for young people, the community board considers it
important to survey their opinions and organizes a panel discussion in the local
high school.
Frank is against the plans and defends his position with a fiery speech:
"The orchard must not be sacrificed! It is a piece of land in which nature and
culture are interwoven in a unique manner and represents a longstanding tradition
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in our area. For decades it has provided homes for birds, insects, rare bats and
other animals, and there's nothing comparable to it anywhere else in the
surroundings. The founders of our community cultivated it with great care, and we
continue to enjoy it's beauty year for year."
Judith contradicts him:
"With due respect for my friend Frank, "she begins carefully. "I'm afraid I don't
agree at all. An orchard isn't a virgin forest. It was made by humans and therefore
it can be altered or replaced by humans. Priority should be given to the present
needs of the young people in our community, not to ideas of the past, and young
people need a place to meet and enjoy themselves."
What do you think?
This story has been the subject of a number of group discussions with 14 and 15 year
olds. In most of the discussions in this age group we have analyzed so far the majority
of the participants spontaneously opt for building the youth center rather than
maintaining the apple orchard. For them the apple orchard is not as valuable as the
new building project. They argue that you can't do very much with an old apple
orchard, whereas a youth center provides distraction.

If one or the other youth expresses interest in maintaining the apple orchard as it is, he
or she usually does so by referring to the animals in the orchard. Thus Anne says:

"Why should we sacrifice the homes of animals for a youth center?~'

The references to animals are often colored by anthropomorphism.

However,

anthropomorphic references to the needs of animals don't seem to be as convincing in
this age group compared to younger children. If arguments in favor of animals and
thus indirectly in favor of the apple orchard are brought forth, they tend to involve
references to scarcity. The participants seem willing jo consider the importance of
animals if they are on the verge of extinction.

15

The Cenler For lhe Sludy of Elhics

ill

Sociely, Vol. 12 No.3

It is interesting that statements in which the participants refer to the apple orchard as a
kind of organic whole have not yet been found. So far we have seen nothing of the
kind of organic or anthropomorphic orientation evident in Thoreau's journals when he
speaks of nature as follows: "The eal1h I tread on is not a dead, inel1 mass. It is a
body, has a spirit, is organic, and fluid to the illfluence of its spirit, alld to whatever
pal1icle of that spirit is in me. She is not dead but sleepeth. " (Thoreau, 1906, pp. 165).
John Muir's writings (1917, pp. 236) also suggest an organic interpretation of nature:
"Contemplating the lace-Likefabric of streams outspread over the mountains, we are
reminded that evelything is flowing - going somewhere, animaLs alld so-called LifeLess
rocks as weLLas water (...J, whiLe the stars go streaming through space puLsed on alld
on forever LikebLood globuLes in Nature's warm heart." In contrast, the young people
with whom we have conducted group discussions seem more inclined to mechanistic
interpretations. The apple orchard is viewed as an entity made up of components that
can be readily replaced or exchanged. For these discussants neither the apple orchard
nor its components seem to possess a kind of individuality or value that might
outweigh their interests. This is particularly evident in the solutions the 14-15 year
olds propose:

- relocate the animals
- replant the trees in a different place
- move the entire apple orchard to a different place
- create a new apple orchard in a different place as compensation for the
destroyed one
- sacrifice only half of the orchard
- allow a few trees to remain
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The young people in this age group seem to be oriented more strongly towards other
people rather than towards nature and non-human natural objects. Thus they could
imagine maintaining the apple orchard if this act could be combined with a social
activity such as establishing an ecology' club in connection with the orchard. Evidence
of this kind can be found in other discussions as well. For example, adolescents would
be willing to protect fish in an aquarium if they were important for another person, but
not for the sake of the fish themselves. And they would be willing to give up skiing if
a close friend did so also, or if a friend were lost in an avalanche, but very few would
be willing to give up skiing to save the Alps.

A tentative conclusion

is that a shift in orientation towards other people in

adolescence coupled with the everyday experience of mechanistic manipulation of
nature and mechanistic interpretations of nature provided by modern science and
technology including ecology weakens the persuasive power of anthropomorphic,
organic and other more empathetic forms of relating to nature. As the philosopher
Hans Blumenberg (1998, pp. 91-110) has pointed out, the machine seems to have
become an absolute metaphor for interpreting the world, one which we no longer
question. The world is no longer like a machine in certain respects; it .lli a machine.
DeScat1es has come to have a firm grip on our minds. And mechanistic interpretations
allow us to shift natural objects from the domain of obligatory morality to the domain
of discretionary morality, and then perhaps even from the moral domain to the
domain of social conventions, which are less loaded emotionally and less binding.

A major project of postmodern society is to find ways to loosen the Cartesian grip and
to develop means conducive to greater empathy with nature. And if identity is indeed
a prerequisite of empathy, then ways and means must be found to encourage identity
with objects such as an apple orchard, a forest, a riv~r or a lake. This might mean
cultivating metaphors other than that of the machine for interpreting the world around
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us, an important facet of what the cognitive scientist Mark Johnson (1993) refers to as
"moral imagination." For example, one could try to think about an ecosystem as a
painting or as a tapestry. According to this line of thinking, repression of organic or
anthropomorphic

reasoning could be considered a loss, the loss of a significant

metaphoric option. Of course, cultivating other metaphors would require providing
appropriate experiences for building such frameworks. In addition, finding a solution
to an environmental problem would require being able to shift from one way of
thinking to another, from one standpoint, perspective or metaphor to another.

What is the role of ethical discourse
we deal with these problems

ill

ill children's

view of these developmellls? And holV should
philosophy?

Some bioethicists (see Bayertz, 1999) maintain that in ethical discourse we must
cultivate a culture of dissension rather than strive for consensus on the basis of a
unifying theory. Perhaps this is a more serious problem in Germany with its Kantian
legacy than it is in the USA. At any rate, in environmental ethics we probably have no
other recourse since the views and forms of justification are so disparate. If dissension
is the rule in moral debate, perhaps we should modify our goals and aim for the
explication of individual positions and pragmatic compromise. This in turn would
require political and social skills in addition to the traditional philosophical skill of
rational argumentation. I wish to illustrate this possibility with a final example of a
discussion in which several children reached a compromise, not moral consensus, on
an environmental issue.

The issue at stake is once again sacrificing an apple orchard for the construction of a
youth center. However, the children discussing the problem are somewhat younger
than those mentioned earlier: 3 girls, Denise (11), Claudia (12) and Lea (13), and two
boys, Timo (11) and Simon (12). The discussion was.conducted by a student, Sven
Mockelmann, and I have translated it from German to English.
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Lea, the eldest in the group, opens the discussion by voicing a position in favor of the
youth center:

Lea: "I'd beforl/ot

necessarily keeping the apple orchard. I kil/d offind it more fun

whel/ something happel/s or so. If there's a discotheque al/d aLLthat, I sort of thil/k
that's better. "

Her position is not particularly vindictive, not yet.

Simon immediately counters with an opposing position in which he refers to the
animals that live in the apple orchard. He draws on analogies to humans and
anth'ropomorphic reasoning to support his argument, and Timo joins him.

Simon: 'The apple orchard

!Jfil..lQ

stay. JIISt think abo Litit. Where are aLLthe animals

sllpposed to go? Look at it this way, it's just as if someone came al/d said: Yeah, we're
goil/g to build a youth cel/ter here. Your house is going to have to be tom down.
Sorry, bllt you're goil/g to have to //love."
Lea: "That's I/ot my problem. "
Claudia: "Can't the animals move somewhere else or something?"
Timo: "I'dforget about the discotheque."
Lea: "Oh I/O.The discotheque is the most important thing. "

A serious conflict is clearly in the making. In the course of the discussion it becomes
obvious that the boys apparently regard the apple orchard as a moral object, not as
such, but because it is a home for animals. For the boys the animals possess moral
status, most likely on the basis of identification and anthropomorphic interpretation,
and they express concern for the creatures' welfare. Their discourse is thus a
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normative one. They believe that animals should be protected on principle. Lea, on
the other hand, and the other girls in the group, are not prepared to conduct a moral
discourse. They are primarily interested in satisfying personal desires and therefore
find the moralizing, anthropomorphic insistence of their counterparts aggravating.
The discussion soon reaches a state?f argumentative circularity and stagnates.

Simon: "But the apple orchard must /lot be destroyed. It has to stay. "
Lea: "It's got to go. "
Simon: "It stays. "
Lea: "It has to go. If I say it's got to go, it's going to go. "
Simon: "Then it sure as heck won't go. Of course the orchard has to stay. "
Lea: "Why?"
Simon: "What will happen with all the animals? Think about it. That's just like
building the trails rapid railroad where all the people have to //love away."

In this case the conflict is between the hedonistic inclinations of one group and the
moral ones of another. According to Angelika Wagner (1995), a psychologist in our
department, the same kind of conflict can occur in the mind of one and the same
individual when a self-imposed imperative collides with other desires (I have to study
for my examination, but I want to go skating in the park) or when two such
imperatives collide with one another (I want to do well on my exam, but I don't want
to be considered an egghead). If one or both imperatives are moral ones, the situation
is pmticularly critical since moral imperatives are by nature stronger than others.
Professor Wagner has identified a number of verbal indicators for imperatives, of
which I shall mention only a few. These include 1) universal quantifiers such as
"everybody", "always", "never", "all the time", "by no means" etc. 2) superlatives
such as "very much" and "especially" 3) explicit irrweratives such a "must" and
"should" and 4) value allributions such as "awful", "terrible", "great", "super". These
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indicators pop up immediately in the moral discourse of the boys; Lea and the other
girls also use them as the conflict comes to a head.

Once a conflict has arisen, either in the mind of an individual or between the members
of a group, a number of different conflict avoidance strategies are mustered up. For
example, by playing down one of the opposing positions, minimizing it or ridiculing it
the conflict may be temporarily called to a halt. In the discussion about the youth
center the children show themselves capable of applying a formidable repertory of
conflict avoidance strategie . For example, both sides play down the importance of
the opposing position. Thus with reference to the apple orchard Lea says:

Lea: "Well, / don't know. One apple orchard //lore or less probably doesn't make
milch difference. "
Simon: "Yes it does."
Timo: "Well one yOllth cellter more or less doesn't make /Iluch difference either."

Or Lea tries to use her somewhat more advanced age and peer pressure as a lever:

Lea: "/f)'oll wallt to go to a discotheque, yOlt have to drive there. And here you'd have
it right next door. That's sllre a lot better. "
Simon: "/ don't care. Who goes to discos anyway?"
Lea: "Maybe yOIl don't, bllt those of

LIS

who are a few years older do."

"/f you

were fOl/1uen, you'd wallt a yOllth cellter too. Don't give me any of that business. "

Lea: "/ bet evelybody / know woltld befor the youth center."
Timo: "/ dOllbt it."
Lea: "Yes they would. Want to bet? My whole class wOllldbefor it."
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The conflict soon flourishes again, and the thoughts of an individual or those of the
group once again rotate in circles. In the present case various solutions are proposed,
but to no avail. The boys make several more or less plausible suggestions that would
permit the apple orchard to remain untouched: You can play soccer in your back yard.
You can have a disco party in your school. People can get together in an ice cream
parlor. The girls suggestions are more mechanistic, more indicative of technical
optimism: You could build a disco between the trees. You could transplant the trees
or find new homes for the animals. But no solution can be found that everyone can
accept.

The psychologist W.T. Powers maintains that circularity of this kind is caused by
clinging to certain rules thought to be absolutely inviolable.

"Logical conflicts are paradoxes. Paradoxes sound like conflicts, but only if one
arbitrarily restricts himself to unrealistic rules at one level of perception. Logical
conflicts are little more than a game one can play or not, as he chooses, and are easily
transcended if one reminds himself of the full range of choices available to human
beings." (Powers, 1973, pp. 251-252)

In order to be able to take advantage of the whole range of choices that exist, Powers
and Angelika Wagner maintain that those involved in a conflict must somehow reach
a state of relaxed awareness. This can be achieved by mentally conceding that a selfimposed imperative may be infringed upon, at least to some extent. It doesn't mean
that the imperative is abandoned completely. One simply lets loose a bit. This in turn
supposedly releases the creative potential of the mind. The decisive question is what
factors contribute towards reaching this state of mind? In moral discussions additional
knowledge can sometimes be of help. But not always. Bumor and well-meaning irony
can also help to encourage backing away from entrenched positions. I suspect that
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appeals to common feelings or common values may also serve the same function. Let
me demonstrate how this came about in the group discussion I have presented.

In the present case, in order to deescalate the conflict and reach a state of relaxed
awareness, the moralists, in this case the animal rights advocates, must seriously
consider the perspective of their opponents and entertain the thought that animals
rights might sometimes have to be curtailed. The hedonists must seriously deal with
the idea that their opponents' concern for animals may not be totally absurd and
mentally concede that their desire for maximal happiness may not be satisfied
completely.

Two factors seem to have permitted the group of children discussing the apple
orchard to reach a compromise, not moral consensus, that all of them could accept.
One factor is the very remarkable role of a natural mediator in this group, Timo.

Timo possesses the capacity to grasp the dilemma at stake. He has a definite position
and states his own choice clearly but concedes the value of the other option as well,
thus indicating that both options are worthy of consideration.

Timo: "I'd really like to have a youth center too, but the apple orchard still has to
stay. "

Whereas Simon is uncompromising in the defense of his anthropomorphic position,
Timo exhibits a sense of wry irony.

Simon: "Look, think of it this way. You're throwlI out all the street alld a fitness center
is built in place of your house."
Lea: "How cOllie 1'111 supposed to be thrown alit all the street?"
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Simon: "Just think about it that way ... "
Timo: "Yeah Lea. The animals get a fitness center and disco and all that stuff and you
have to crawl around in the street. "

Timo is wilIing to consider both sides of the issue, but he also clearly articulates the
varying importance of the underlying values.

Timo: "Athletics and discos aren't as important for kids as a place to live is for
animals. "

And he is capable of disarming the representatives of the opposition by directly
confronting them with the one-sidedness of their position.

Timo: "Are you really so opposed to animals?"

It is also Timo who initiates a decisive change in the course of the discussion by
conjuring up an aesthetic image that is only marginalIy related to the issue at stake, an
image of aestheticalIy attractive animals.

Timo: "[mean, don't you find it beautiful when a hundred wild geesejly overhead?"
Lea (stilI resistant): "Sorry, I've never seen anything like that. "
Claudia: "I've seen at least fifty. "
Timo: "They jly in a V-shaped formation. Do you think that's crap too?"

Lea is now prepared to make an important concession.

Lea: "No, [ don't think that's crap. [ just sort of think a disco is a lot of fun and [ meall,
I

[ agree that it's bad for the animals alld so, bUI what can you do? .... You ollly live
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once, and evelybody wants to have filii. Of course I think it's beautiful to see things
like that."

At this point Simon

presents

a solution

willing to accept. The children

that all of the participants,

even Lea, are

decide to erect a tent on a nearby field as a temporary

disco. They are aware that some animals will be disturbed

this way as well, but they

agree that far fewer animals will be harmed than if the apple orchard were cut down.
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Is constructive compromise what children's philosophy should aim for? Reaching
compromises on environmental issues sounds more like politics than philosophy. And
advocates of environmenL:'11holism, of which I am one, cannot avoid feeling
uncomfortable about compromises of this kind. Every compromise means that some
part of nature is sacrificed, and we really cannot afford much more sacrifice. What
about philosophical truth? As a holist, shouldn't I be uncompromising in striving to
convince others by rational argumentation that nature and all parts of it are
intrinsically valuable? Obviously

rigorous philosophical discourse is necessary for

defining one's own position, even though in the long run this position may not be as
clear cut and unvacillating as some ethicists think it should be. But ethics is not only a
matter of philosophers, and the more ethical decisions are delegated to people outside
of academic philosophy and negotiated in discourse that is not strictly philosophical,
the more permeable the boundaries between philosophy and politics, between the
search for truth and the search for constructive solutions become.
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